What was selected to be included in the book? Anything that would shed light on the events, activities, and experiences of the soldiers. This includes what happened in the battle and how it happened, as well as plans of commanders. These are difficult to choose when trying to be historically accurate and completely dependent on testimony of others. Hence the quote from Lincoln’s instructions to the jury in the Rock Island Bridge Case regarding differing recollections: “We must take them at their word, as long as we can.”
‘As long as we can’ is the trick. Lincoln himself exploited it, planting questions when none had been raised, for example, and then not pursuing the answers, to leave doubt in the jurers’ minds. For this book, statements from multiple sources that were in agreement were prime. Statements that were clearly self-serving and contradicting what others had said which seemed reliable were omitted. Exceptions were included when the source was a primary authority, such as General John Geary, and the statements were more or less taken to be official though clearly wrong — they serve to demonstrate the contradictions and self-service and the reliability of not only Geary, for example, for others in his command. One example was official reports of the regiments in one of his brigades for the 15th of May: they were clearly dictated by one person. Such statements, when the contradictory, are included, as in this book, serve to reveal errors in other books.
So, if they could not be taken at their word, this book shows why, especially with the differing testimony.
However, generally, figuring out what commanders intended or did from scanty or ambiguous quotes was avoided. Partly because it is likely to be wrong in some way and partly because there was plenty to learn anyway.
One tough example is why, how, and when Colonel Ireland’s, 1st Brigade of Geary’s division got mixed up with Coburn’s 2nd Brigade in Butterfield’s division when Butterfields assault got underway. Accounts are too vague. But some that agree with other accounts and are clearer were included.
Before Butterfield deployed, Geary and Robinson had their divisions formed up by the Dalton road just north of the hills that were to be fought over. It is clear Ireland’s brigade was with his division, which was behind Robinson’s. When Butterfield brought his division up (they seem to have waited for ammunition while he conferred with Geary and Robinson and Hooker), he went ahead of the other divisions and gave his their orders and they started to deploy. Butterfield then got information that the left hill was infested and he gave orders for Wood’s brigade to clear them out before the assault began. Wood had been expected to follow Ward’s brigade en echelon on the left and Coburn was to follow on the right. Here is where things went haywire and stories got quite as mixed up as the regiments, even absurdly so.
There not enough room in the ravine they were to have started from. Wood was left on the road and Coburn was at the bottom of the ravine, not even able to get the regiments in the needed arrangement till after Ward got out of the way. Yet, by all accounts, Ireland’s brigade was right of Coburn by the time Coburn started forward and then crashed right though them, going left. How did he get there. And why?
One scenario imagines an aid galloping up to Geary with a note to send a brigade to replace Wood on Ward’s left. (Geary had no more idea of terrain and conditions as the others — even less the Butterfield’s men would have by then.) That would explain the “unmilitary way” Alexander described Geary as putting the division in motion.
One of Ireland’s men wrote that when they left the formation and entered the ravine they passed by Wood’s right regiment. That has not been contradicted, though it is only one source.
Question arises: Did Ireland actually start into the ravine before Coburn? Seems a plausible explanation, but only speculation. Yet he did get on Coburn’s right. Coburn did not expect Ireland to crash into him. Did he even know he was there? Ireland apparently was just as surprised. Their is no agreement by men of either brigade on about which was the other brigade.
A historian should be looking for multiple sources and finding those that are at least somewhat verifiable instead of trying to figure out a narrative to explain events or reasons without much to go on.
Side note regarding reliability: Captain Alexander, of 111th PA in Ireland’s brigade describes the day but in such a way that it seems almost entirely second hand, even the part included in the book. Perhaps more, instead of less, should have been included so that readers can find out for themselves what is reliable. One that stands out is the claim that the 111th drove the gunners out of the fort. That contradicts everyone else, who say Butterfield’s men, mostly Ward and Coburn’s men, did the fighting. Other of Geary’s own men who state they did not enter the fort but instead laid down in front of it after they got there. (Note, Geary’s division was sent up to replace Butterfield’s after the fight was over and helped hold the fort — from the outside).
So, many sources help find out what stories are more reliable and which are suspect and to perhaps resolve some questions. If they completely contradicted and did not reveal anything new, they were omitted. But if ambiguity resulted, that needed to be for the reader to discern. If they gave reader some real perspective, even insight, into how much is not gospel, they might have been included.
Note: Geary’s claims have been taken for granted in all history written about the battle — until this one. Others say Wood was behind Ward, as planned. And none mention the fight over who captured the guns — they take Geary at his official record and claims by some of his men, who fought in print for the glory.
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